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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-2736 
 ___________ 
 
 DASHRATLAL PATEL, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                                                                                       Respondent 
 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A070-703-804 ) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Annie S. Garcy 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 1, 2011 
 
 Before: FUENTES, VANASKIE and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: July 28, 2011 ) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Dashratlal Patel, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the order of 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the Immigration Judge’s order 
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denying Patel’s motion to reopen.  
Patel entered the United States in 1991 without a valid visa or other entry 
document.
1
  In 1993, he filed an asylum application, which was denied; his case was 
referred immediately to the immigration court for deportation proceedings.  Although the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) sent a hearing notice and show cause 
order to Patel’s record address by certified mail in 1993, the certified mail was returned 
to the INS unclaimed.  (A.R. 118-19.)  In October 1993, the INS closed the deportation 
proceeding administratively due to Patel’s nonappearance.  (A.R. 114.)  In August 1994, 
through new counsel, Patel filed a motion to re-calendar his case and submitted a change 
of address form indicating his new address as “141-27 Main Street #1F, Flushing NY 
11367.”  (A.R. 106-08.)  In December 1994, the INS sent a show cause order and notice 
of a hearing scheduled for February 9, 1995 (hereafter the “1995 notice”), by certified 
mail to Patel using his new address, but the agency failed to include his apartment 
number.  (A.R. 98.)  The certified mail was returned as undeliverable.  (A.R. 94-95.)  The 
INS also sent the 1995 notice via certified mail to counsel of record, who confirmed 
receipt.  (A.R. at 96-97.)  When Patel failed to appear at the February 1995 hearing, the IJ 
held a hearing and entered an in absentia order deporting Patel to India.  (A.R. at 90.) 
In 2008, with the assistance of new counsel, Patel filed a motion in immigration 
court to rescind the in absentia order and reopen the deportation proceedings.  (A.R. 43-
                                                 
1
  Patel married Kokilaben Patel in India in 1980.  They have two Indian citizen 
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85.)  He claimed that neither he nor his attorney had received written notice of the 
February 1995 hearing or of the consequences of failing to appear and that he received no 
oral notice in his native language.  (A.R. 46-48.)  The IJ denied the motion, determining 
that Patel failed to show that he was not properly served with notices and show cause 
orders in 1993 and 1995.  The IJ found that although Patel attested that he had received 
no “letters” about deportation proceedings in 1993, he did not specifically deny receiving 
the 1993 hearing notice and show cause order.  Pet’r Brf. at A-6, A-7.  The IJ also found 
that Patel’s retention of new counsel in 1994 to seek re-calendaring of the deportation 
proceedings, demonstrated that Patel knew that he had been placed in deportation 
proceedings in 1994.  Id. at A-7.  The IJ ultimately concluded that Patel suffered no 
prejudice from the INS’s failure to properly notify him in 1993 because his case was 
closed administratively when he did not appear.  Id. at A-7, A-8.  As for the February 
1995 hearing, the IJ found that the INS successfully served notice to counsel, which Patel 
failed to rebut.  Id. at A-8.  The BIA dismissed Patel’s appeal, holding that the IJ’s fact-
finding was not clearly erroneous.  Id. at A-4, A-5. 
We have jurisdiction to review final orders of the BIA under 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(1).  Where, as here, the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s decision and reasoning 
pursuant to Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994), we review the 
decisions of both the IJ and the BIA to determine whether the BIA’s decision to defer to 
                                                                                                                                                             
children, Bhavika and Ravi.  The entire family is now in the United States. 
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the IJ was appropriate.
2
  Shehu v. Att’y Gen., 482 F.3d 652, 657 (3d Cir. 2007).  “We 
review the denial of a motion to reopen a removal order entered in absentia for abuse of 
discretion.”  Cabrera-Perez v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 109, 115 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing INS v. 
Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1992)).  Thus, in order to succeed on the petition for 
review, Patel must ultimately show that the discretionary decision was arbitrary, 
irrational, or contrary to law.  See Tipu v. INS, 20 F.3d 580, 582 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Because Patel’s immigration proceedings were initiated prior to the 1996 
amendments to the INA, we must apply the notice requirements set forth in former INA § 
242B [8 U.S.C. § 1252b (repealed 1996)].  Under that statute, aliens were to be notified 
of the time and place of their deportation hearings either in person or by certified mail 
sent to the alien or the alien’s counsel of record.  See INA § 242B(a)(2)(A) [8 U.S.C. § 
1252b(a)(2)(A)].  Written notice was sufficient if it was “provided at the most recent 
address” furnished by the alien.  Id.  Under the pre-1996 law, an in absentia deportation 
order could be rescinded at any time provided the alien demonstrated that he did not 
receive notice in accordance with subsection (a)(2).  See INA § 242B(c)(3)(B) [8 U.S.C. 
1252b(c)(3)(B)]. 
Patel argues that both the IJ and the BIA applied the wrong evidentiary standard in 
                                                 
2
  The IJ also denied reopening sua sponte, a decision that Patel does not 
challenge.  In any event, we lack jurisdiction to consider such a discretionary decision.  
See Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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considering whether he had received proper notice of the 1993 and 1995 hearings.
3
  We 
need not dwell on the issue with respect to the 1993 hearing notice because the IJ closed 
the deportation proceedings indefinitely rather than enter a deportation order in absentia.  
In any event, it is the notice of February 1995 hearing to which we turn our attention 
because that hearing resulted in the in absentia order that Patel sought to rescind in his 
motion to reopen. 
The statute in effect in 1995 provided for written notice via certified mail “to the 
alien or to the alien’s counsel of record.”  INA § 242B(a)(2)(A) [8 U.S.C. § 
1252b(a)(2)(A)].  The IJ found that in 1995, the INS attempted to serve Patel by certified 
mail at the most recent address on record, and that the mail was returned as 
undeliverable.  The INS, however, successfully served notice of the February 1995 
hearing and the show cause order to the attorney of record by certified mail in accordance 
with the law.  Both the IJ and the BIA thus properly applied a strong presumption of 
effective service to counsel of record in Patel’s case.  See Santana Gonzalez v. Att’y 
Gen., 506 F.3d 274, 277 (3d Cir. 2007) (strong presumption applies when service of 
notice of a deportation hearing is by certified mail and there is proof of attempted 
delivery) (citing Matter of Grijalva, 21 I. & N. Dec. 27, 37 (BIA 1995)).  Patel offered no 
evidence to rebut the strong presumption in immigration court or before the BIA.  Id. at 
                                                 
3
  We are unpersuaded by Patel’s claim that the BIA erroneously engaged in fact-
finding when it noted that Patel failed to exercise due diligence in filing his motion to 
reopen in 2008.  The BIA relied on the IJ’s finding that Patel was aware of his 
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278 (an alien may rebut the strong presumption only by presenting “substantial and 
probative evidence”).  Record evidence of Patel’s attorney’s return receipt thus was 
sufficient to establish that notice was properly served.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
there was no abuse of discretion by the IJ or the BIA.
4
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
                                                                                                                                                             
deportation proceeding when he filed his motion to re-calendar in 1994. 
4
  Because Patel’s claims alleging error by the IJ and the BIA are meritless, his 
related due process claim also fails. 
